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DEPO-PROVERA, CASTRATION, AND THE
PROBATION OF RAPE OFFENDERS:
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
William Green*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Rape is a major violent crime. Convicted rapists are sentenced to
lengthy prison terms, life imprisonment, or even death. Probation, usually not available as a sentencing alternative, was offered to the defendants in two recent rape trials. In State v. Brown,1 a South Carolina
judge offered three convicted rapists thirty years' imprisonment or probation with the condition of surgical castration.' In People v. Gauntlett,3 a Michigan judge sentenced a convicted rapist to one year's imprisonment and five years' probation with the condition that the convict
receive regular injections of Depo-Provera, a drug sometimes characterized as chemical castration.' The Brown and Gauntlett cases have
brought medical and legal attention to bear on the use of surgical castration and Depo-Provera injections as probation conditions for con5
victed rapists.

* Assistant Professor of Government, Morehead State University. B.A., Kent State University (1963); M.A., Kent State University (1967); Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo
(1977); J.D., University of Kentucky (1984). This article was presented in an earlier version at
the American Political Science Association 1985 Annual Meeting under the title "Castration,
Rape Offenders, and the Conditions of Probation" with the financial assistance of Morehead State
University. This article benefited from the advice of Professor John Batt and the assistance of Ms.
JoEllen McComb, Research Librarian, both of the College of Law, University of Kentucky. This
article also benefited from the appellate briefs provided by the following defense attorneys: Mr.
Stephen John Henry in State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985); Mr. Glen W.
Thomason in State v. Vaughan; and Mr. William L. Fette in People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App.
737, 352 N.W.2d 310, modified, 419 Mich. 909, 353 N.W.2d 463 (1984).
I. 284 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985).
2. Id. at 409, 326 S.E.2d at 411.
3. 134 Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W.2d 310, modified, 419 Mich. 909, 353 N.W.2d 463
(1984).
4. Id. at 744, 352 N.W.2d at 312.
5. Probation conditions have been a neglected area of study. Commentators who have written on the subject have been critical of probation conditions as moralistic, impractical, unconstitu-
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Section II of this article sets out a framework for the analysis of
surgical and pharmacological castration as probation conditions. In
particular, this section examines the medical evidence and evaluates the
appellate court decisions in the two rape cases in which surgical and
chemical castration were probation conditions. 6 Section III examines
the statutory questions. For instance, is it unreasonable and impractical
for a judge to condition probation on the castration of the defendant?
Can the defendant give knowing and informed consent to a castration
condition? Section IV evaluates the constitutional questions. Does probation with a castration condition violate any of the following constitutional rights of the defendant: his first amendment right of thought and
privacy in those thoughts, his eighth amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment, and his fourteenth amendment procedural
and substantive due process rights? Section V will draw some conclu-

tional, and a reflection of obsolete criminological concepts. See, e.g., R. CARTER & L. WILKINS,
PROBATION. PAROLE, AND COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS (2d ed. 1976); N. COHEN & J. GOBERT.
THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE (1983); Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEO. L. J. 809 (1963).
The use of Depo-Provera was also raised incidentally in two previously reported appellate
cases, Dennis v. State, 13 Md. App. 564, 284 A.2d 256 (1971), and State v. Christopher, 133
Ariz. 508, 652 P.2d 1031 (1982). Dennis involved a question of the quality of psychiatric testimony in a rape case where the defendant had plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The defendant appealed the judge's ruling that he "had not produced satisfactory evidence of insanity to
cross the threshold and rebut the presumption of insanity." Dennis, at 566, 284 A.2d at 257. The
appellate court of Maryland, while affirming the lower court's judgment, held that the ambivalent
and equivocal testimony of the defense psychiatrist "lack[ed] probative thrust in any direction.
The defense psychiatrist's clear concern seemed to be that the appellant not be subjected to the
punitive process but rather to a course of treatment, prescribed by herself, that would amount to
'a chemical semicastration, reducing the sexual urge by a drug called provera.'" Id. at 568, 284
A.2d at 258.
Christopher, 133 Ariz. at 508, 652 P.2d at 1031, involved the revocation of a defendant's
probation for child molestation and the sentencing of the defendant on his guilty pleas to six
additional charges of child molestation which occurred during the probationary period. Id. at 509,
652 P.2d at 1032. During the first trial, the psychiatric evaluation in the pre-sentence report had
concluded, "behavior modification would be the most effective treatment plan but . . .the more
drastic alternative of 'chemical castration' . . . could also be used." Id. at 509, 652 P.2d at 1032.
The defendant appealed from the revocation of his probation and sentence on the additional
charges, arguing that he had an eighth and fourteenth amendment right to treatment and rehabilitation while on parole which the state had "denied him ... when it did not require his treatment
while on probation to include chemical castration and behavior modification." Id. Thus, the defendant argued that the state's failure precluded it from imposing a lengthy prison sentence on
him for the offenses underlying the probation violation. Id. at 509-10, 652 P.2d at 1032-33. The
Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the defendant's argument that the federal cruel and unusual
punishment and due process clauses required the state to provide the defendant with a rehabilitation program. Id. at 510, 625 P.2d at 1033. Rehabilitation was just one of the purposes of punishment. Id. Hence, the court stated that it would not interfere with the trial court's reasonable
exercise of discretion because "probation itself is a matter of grace and not of right, so too is
rehabilitative treatment while on probation." Id. at 511, 652 P.2d at 1034 (citation omitted).
6. See generally STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 234 (5th ed. 1982) (chemical and surgical methods are both mentioned under the definition of castration).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
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1I. FRAMEWORK

Depo-Provera

as probation

FOR ANALYSIS

Medical and psychological therapy alternatives to incarceration exist,
but they are generally unavailable to the convicted rapist.7 Surgical
castration and Depo-Provera are, however, attractive medical alternatives to judges who are at a loss to offer the convicted rapist anything
but incarceration in a failing prison system. At the same time, there is
substantial criticism of the use of these two medical therapies for criminal legal purposes. 8 What is the current medical research status of surgical castration and Depo-Provera?
A.

Medical Research

Castration is a surgical procedure9 which has been used to abolish
male sexual activity for utilitarian, eugenic, and criminal purposes.1 0
The legal castration of rapists in the contemporary western world is
limited to five western European nations: Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland."1 In Denmark, for
example, voluntary therapeutic castration is performed at the Herstedvester Institute for Abnormal Criminals. According to Dr. Georg
Sturup, the institute's director and a leading authority on castration,
the institute's surgical-psychiatric program involves "a complete and
well-analyzed life history and thorough psychiatric examination,"' 2 sur7. Abel, Blanchard & Becker, Psychological Treatment of Rapists, in SEXUAL ASSAULT
99-115 (M. Walker & S. Broadsky eds. 1976) [hereinafter Abel].
8. The use of Depo-Provera in the treatment of sex offenders has been the subject of three
recent law review articles: Comment, The Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Offenders, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 295 (1984); Comment, Sexual Offenders and the Use of Depo-Provera, 22
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565 (1985); Comment, The Use of Depo-Provera for Treating Male Sex
Offenders: A Review of the Constitutional and Medical Issues, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 181 (1984).
9. "The surgical procedures for sterilizing the male are (I) severing and tying the cut ends
of the tubes that carry sperm from the testicles to the urethra (vasectomy); or (2) removal of the
testicles (castration)." C. LEVY. THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW 28 (1983).
10. Sturup, Castration: The Total Treatment, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, CLINICAL,
AND LEGAL ASPECTS 362 (H. Resnik & M. Wolfgang eds. 1972). The contemporary American
experience has focused on state statutes which provide for compulsory sterilization of mental defectives and habitual criminals for eugenic reasons. See Paul, State Eugenic Sterlization History:
A Brief Overview, in EUGENIC STERLIZATION 25 (J. Robitscher 1973). State sterlization statutes
have been challenged on due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and equal protections
grounds, but since the decision of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), in which the Supreme Court
upheld a Virginia statute requiring the sterilization of prison inmates, "[tihe majority of cases
have found state statutes to be constitutional." C. LEVY. supra note 9, at 31. See also N. KITTRIE.
THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971); D. MYERS. THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW: A MEDICOLEGAL STUDY (1970).
II. See generally J. MACDONALD, RAPE OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 305 (1971).
12. Sturup, supra note 10, at 376.
Published by
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gery, and a six months' aftercare period based on "individualized integrating group therapy."' Once performed, castration is surgically irreversible. Its primary effect is to reduce a man's sexual fantasy life and
his physical capacity to respond to sexual stimuli."' Biological side effects include a postoperative period of sweating and blushing, loss of
body and facial hair, increase in body weight, and softening of the
skin.1 5 Psychological changes are more difficult to assess, though "[ilt
is common to see a relaxation resulting from the lack of pathological
libido." 6 Recidivism appears to be remarkably low and Dr. Sturup
claims "we have not seen a rapist ... rape after castration."'1 7 Even so,
castration "does not always abolish the capacity for sexual intercourse"' 18 or foreclose the possibility that the castrate may obtain synthetic testosterone to restore his sexual potency.1 9
Female hormones are an alternative to surgical castration.
Medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) is a synthetic progesterone manufactured by Upjohn under the trade name Depo-Provera.20 Known as

13. Id.
14. J. MACDONALD, supra note II, at 306.
15. Sturup, supra note 10, at 381.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 379.
18. J. MACDONALD, supra note I1,at 313.
19. See Heim, Sexual Behavior of Sex Offenders, 10 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 11,
17-18 (1981); Rees, Voluntary Castration of Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders, 13 CRIM. L.
BULL. 30, 33-36 (1977).
20. Depo-Provera product information including its indications, contraindications, precautions, adverse reactions, and warnings for women is contained in PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE
1839-41 (40th ed. 1986) [hereinafter P.D.R.].
Depo-Provera has FDA approval to treat amenorrhea, irregulor uterine bleeding, and as
"[a]djunctive therapy and palliative treatment of inoperable, recurrent, and metastatic endometrial carcinoma or renal carcinoma." Id. at 1840.
Depo-Provera's contraindications are "[t]hrombophlebitis, thromboembolic disorders, cerebral apoplexy or patients with past history of these conditions[,] carcinoma of the breast[,]
[u]ndiagnosed vaginal bleeding[,] [m]issed abortion[,] diagnostic test for pregnancy[,] and
[kinown sensitivity to DEPO-PROVERA Sterile Aqueous Suspension ... ." Id.
Depo-Provera's adverse reactions in women are "breakthrough bleeding[, . . .change in
menstrual flow[,] amenorrhea[,] endema[,] change in weight[,] changes in cervical erosion and
cervical secretions[,] cholestatic jaundice[,] rash . . .with and without pruritus[,] melasma or
chloasma[, and] mental depression. A statistically significant association has been demonstrated
. . . [with] the following serious adverse reactions: thrombophlebitis; pulmonary embolism and
cerebral thrombosis and embolism." Id. The PDR goes on to provide a warning for women:
"There is an increased risk of birth defects . . .[in children whose mothers take the drug] during
the first four months of pregnancy." Id.
Cypertone acetate, another synthetic progesterone, is used as a female contraceptive in the
Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland. Research on its use is reported by
Cooper, Ismail, Phanjoo & Love, Antiandrogen (Cyproterone Acetate) Therapy in Deviant Hypersexuality, 120 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 59 (1972); Davies, Cypertone Acetate for Male Hypersexuality, 2 J. INT'L MED. RES. 159 (1974); and Langervin, Paitich & Hucker, The Effects of Aggressiveness Training, Provera. Sex Therapies in the Treatment of Genital Exhibitionism, 10 J.
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"the shot," it is an injectible steroid which prevents ovulation in
women 2' and suppresses plasma levels of testosterone in men.2 The
drug, first synthesized in 1954, was initially used to treat gynecological
disorders 23 and was later shown to be an effective female contraceptive. 2' Depo-Provera's use in the treatment of sexual deviation disorders, or paraphilias, began in 1966 at the Biosexual Psychological
Clinic of Johns Hopkins Hospital.2 5 Dr. John Money used Depo-

Provera in conjunction with counseling in a clinic program which in-

cluded a one or two months' hospital stay followed by outpatient treatment with a final assessment at the end of one year. Depo-Provera, Dr.
Money argues, strengthens "the threshold or barrier to sexual arousal.
[As a consequence,] the individual is metaphorically on vacation from

& EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 275 (1979).
21. A 150-milligram dose can prevent conception up to three months by suppressing the
hormones that normally induce ovulation. Chen, Depo-Provera Under Scrutiny, 123 ScI. NEWS
122 (1983).
22. A dosage varying from 100 to 600 milligrams (mg.) per week has been used to treat
deviant sexual behavior with most patients receiving 200 to 300 mg. per week. See. e.g., Berlin &
Meinecke, Treatment of Sex Offenders with Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment Modalities, and Preliminary Findings, 138 AM J. PSYCHIATRY 601, 603-05
(1981); Blumer & Migeon, Hormone and Hormonal Agents in the Treatment of Aggession, 160
J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 127, 128-30 (1975); Gagne, Treatment of Sex Offenders with
Medroxyprogestrone Acatate, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 644, 644-45 (1981); Money, Wiedeking,
Walker & Gain, Combined Antiandrogenic and Counseling Program for the Treatment of 46XY
and 47XYY Sex Offenders, in HORMONES, BEHAVIOR, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 106, 108 (E. Sachar
ed. 1976) [hereinafter Money].
23. Depo-Provera, first introduced in 1959, was approved to treat amenorrhea (no menstrual
flow), irregular uterine bleeding, and threatened miscarriage. The FDA withdrew its approval for
these three miscarriage treatments in 1974, the same year it refused, for the first time, to approve
Depo-Provera as a female contraceptive. 39 Fed. Reg. 38,226 (1974).
24. Depo-Provera has been used by 10 million women over the past 15 years in over 80
foreign countries, but since Depo-Provera does not have Food and Drug Administration approval,
it cannot be legally used in the United States as a female contraceptive. See Potts & Paxman,
Depo-Provera: Ethical Issues in Its Testing and Distribution, I J. MED. ETHICS 9 (1984); see also
39 Fed. Reg. 38,226 (1974); Hearing Notice, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,555 (1978).
25. Paraphilias are diagnosable psychiatric disorders "whose essential feature . . . is that
unusual or bizarre imagery or acts are necessary for sexual excitement. Such imagery or acts tend
to be insistently and involuntarily repetitive and generally involve either (1) preference for use of
a nonhuman object for sexual arousal, (2) repetitive sexual activity with humans involving real or
simulated suffering or humiliation, or (3) repetitive sexual activity with nonconsenting partners."
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
266 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM Iii]. The paraphilias described in DSM III are fetishism,
transvestism, zoophilia, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, sexual masochism, and sexual sadism. Id. at 268-75; see also Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 22, at 601-02.
The four types of paraphiliac treatments are psychotherapy, behavior therapies, surgery including neurosurgery and orchidestomy (castration), and medication including Cyproterone acetate and Medroxyprogesterone acetate (Depo-Provera). Berlin & Coyle, Sexual Deviation Syndromes, 149 JOHNS HOPKINS MED. J. 119, 121 (1981); Berlin, Sex Offenders: A Biomedical
Perspective and a Status Report on Biomedical Treatment, in THE SEXUAL AGGRESSOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON TREATMENT 112 (J. Greer & 1. Stuart eds. 1983).
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the demands of his sex drive and is so able to experience an erotic or
2
psycho-sexual realignment in conjunction with counseling.1 Dr. Pierre
Gagne, who has also used Depo-Provera in conjunction with milieu
therapy at Sherbrooke Hospital in Quebec, calls Depo-Provera "the
27
treatment of choice for patients with deviant sexual behavior."
Depo-Provera is a psychotropic drug which controls paraphiliac
behavior by its reduction of erotic imagery 8 and by its negative effect
on genital functioning, including a reduction in spermatogenesis, erection, and ejaculation.2 9 The most common adverse side effects during
its use include fatigue, weight gain, hot flashes, cold sweats, hypertension, headaches, hypogonadism, and insomnia.3 0 Depo-Provera may
have long-term side effects because it must be continuously administered to control the paraphiliac's behavior.3 1 The major dispute is over

26. Money, supra note 22, at 119. See also Money, Use of an Androgen-Depleting Hormone in the Treatment of Male Sex Offenders, 6 J. SEX RES. 165 (1970); Money, Discussion on
Hormonal Inhibition of Libido in Male Sex Offenders, in ENDRICRINOLOGY & HUM. BEHAV. (R.
Michael ed. 1968).
27. Gagne, supra note 22. Other research reports on the use of Depo-Provera to treat sex
offenders, not otherwise cited, include: Barry & Ciccone, Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment
of Aggressive Sexual Offenders: Preliminary Report of Three Cases, 3 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179 (1975); Bradford, The Hormonal Treatment of Sex Offenders, II BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 159 (1983); Meyer, Walker & Wiedeking, Pituitary Function in Adult
Males Receiving Medroxyprogesterone Acetate, 28 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1072 (1977); Spodak,
Falck & Rappeport, The Hormonal Treatment of Paraphiliacs With Depo-Provera, 5 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 304 (1978).
28. Blumer and Migeon report: "[Tihe effects of MPA cannot be simply interpreted by its
androgen-depleting effect. There is a direct effect on cerebral functions, as large doses of progesterone administered intravenously have an anesthetic effect." Blumer & Migeon, supra note 22, at
128.
29. Money found that "it was possible to show by calibrating the dosage [of Depo-Proveral,
the frequency of ejaculating, erection, and erotic behavior could also be calculated." Money,
supra note 22, at 11. See also Money, Use of an Androgen-Depleting Hormone in the Treatment
of Male Sex Offenders, J. SEX RES. 165, 168 (1970). Gagne reported: "There was a diminution in
the frequency and quality of the patient's erections and ejaculations. Generally, the patients became sexually impotent as testosterone levels decreased to one-fourth of the initial levels." Gagne,
supra note 22, at 645.
30. All studies of sex offenders cited in this article report Depo-Provera's adverse reactions
on men. See. e.g., Blumer & Migeon, supra note 22, at 133-37 (a particularly detailed example).
Common contraindications and adverse reactions for women are described in P.D.R., supra note
20, at 1840-41.
31. Depo-Provera is effective only while the treatment is being administered. See Berlin &
Meinecke, supra note 22, at 607; Cordoba & Chapel, Medroxyprogesterone Acetate Antiandrogen Treatment of Hypersexuality in a Pedophiliac Sex Offender, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1036, 1039 (1983). The long-term effects of Depo-Provera on men are unknown. See Gagne,
supra note 22, at 646; Pinta, Treatment of Obsessive Pedophiliac Fantasies with Medrozyprogestrone, 13 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 369, 372 (1978). Studies suggest, however, that its non-contraceptive use in high doses produces atypical sperm and is associated with congential abnormalities.

See

CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS. REPORT OF THE DEPO-PROVERA STUDY GROUP 5

(1983). Thus, Depo-Provera's long-term use to treat paraphilias may lead to deformed children
because the contraceptive dosage disapproved by the FDA, 150 mg. every three months, is onehttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
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the potential of the drug as a human carcinogen. Laboratory experiments demonstrate that Depo-Provera produces cancers in two animal
species.3 2 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), relying on these
studies, has twice refused to approve Upjohn's application for the
drug's use as a female contraceptive. 3 The FDA does, however, permit
its experimental use in the treatment of sex offenders. 3 '
Surgical castration and Depo-Provera have common research design problems. Their use in the treatment of sexual disorders is based
primarily on case reports and single-case experimental designs, but not
on controlled group studies. 35 The other major problem with this refourth to one-fourtieth the dose given to male sex offenders. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
32. Long-term toxicology studies in female monkeys and dogs reveal Depo-Provera produces
uterine and breast cancer, but the relevance of these findings to human males is unknown. P.D.R.,
supra note 20, at 1840.
33. 39 Fed. Reg. 38,226 (1974); Hearing Notice 43 Fed. Reg. 28,555 (1978).
The FDA's odyssey with Depo-Provera's use as a female contraceptive is surveyed in Chen,
supra note 21, at 122; Rosenfeld, The Food and Drug Administration and Medroxyprogesterone
Acetate, 249 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2922, 2924 (1983); Sun, Depo-Provera Debate Revs Up at FDA,
217 Sci. 424-28 (1982); Sun, Panel Says Depo-Provera Not Proved Safe, 226 Sci. 950-51
(1984). The PDR clearly states that "[tlhe use of DEPO-PROVERA . . . for contraception is
investigational since there are unresolved questions relating to the safety for this indication."
PDR. supra note 20, at 1840.
34. Upjohn has never applied to the FDA for approval for Depo-Provera's use to treat
paraphiliacs or rapists. Instead, Depo-Provera has been used by researchers for experimental purposes pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1986).
The medical/psychiatric literature clearly indicates that Depo-Provera is an experimental
drug. Most importantly, there is a lack of knowledge about the basic assumption upon which the
sex offender experiments are based: the relationship between the drug's reduction of testosterone
levels and deviant or compulsive sexual behavior. Emil Pinta states: "The mechanism whereby
MPA .. .reduce[s] aggressiveness and sexual arousal is not completely understood .... It is not
entirely clear whether plasma testosterone suppression is due solely to an inhibition of gonadatropin release or to decreased testosterone production at the gonadal level." Pinta, supra note 31,
at 369-70. The medical/psychiatric literature also advises caution in the use of Depo-Provera for
the treatment of pedophilias, in view of its experimental character. Id. at 372; see also Blumer &
Migeon supra note 28, at 133; K. FREUND. THERAPUTIC SEX DRIVE REDUCTION 5-6 (1980);
Potts & Paxman, supra note 24, at 9.
35. Pacht, The Rapist in Treatment: Professional Myths and Psychological Realities, in
SEXUAL ASSAULT 90 (M. Walker & S. Broadsky eds. 1976).
Sidney M. Wolfe and Cary LaChen succinctly state the case against Depo-Provera research:
Although the drug has been used for the treatment of sexually deviant men for at least
fifteen years there have been no controlled studies with long-term follow-up. . . .There is
currently no good scientific evidence that Depo-Provera is effective for the treatment of
male sex offenders. The evidence used is . . .anecdotal. . . .There have been no doubleblind studies which compare the effectiveness of Depo-Provera plus counseling or psychotherapy to psychotherapy or counseling and a saline injection . . .and no studies which
compare the effect of Depo-Provera and counseling to Depo-Provera alone, without the
concomitant use of therapy. [Since . . .mlost of the papers reporting use of Depo-Provera
for this purpose use the drug in conjunction with psychotherapy or counseling[,J . . . .it is
impossible to know . . . whether the counseling alone would have been an equally effective
Published by
eCommons, 1986

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 12:1

search is its almost exclusive focus on subjects with a variety of
paraphilias. Very few rapists are included. Of the 900 men castrated at
36
Herstedvester from 1935 to 1961, only eighteen were rapists. Rapists
could have qualified for Money's study of 46XY and 47XYY sex offenders but none were referred. 37 Gagne's study of forty-eight male
subjects treated with Depo-Provera included only five men convicted of
rape or attempted rape.38
None of this research has directly addressed the crucial question:
are treatments developed and used to treat sexual deviates applicable to
rapists? If rape stems from a sexual impulse, it may be treatable with
surgical castration or Depo-Provera. Popular and professional opinion
39
suggests, however, that rape is the sexual manifestation of violence.
"Research shows that rape expresses . . . the need to control, dominate
or hurt. So even if you reduce the felon's sexual drive . . . he will sim4
ply find other ways to exercise his deviance upon the community."
This research has, however, been based on the convicted rapist who
'
"clearly is not representative of the general class of rapists." 41
Dr.
individuals
all
not
and
term
legal
a
is
"Rape
observes:
Pacht
Asher
who commit rape neatly fit into the same personality or behavioral
classification.' 2 There is some evidence that rapists are treatable, but,
Pacht says, effective treatment must recognize the lack of homogeneity
among rapists and select from the continuum of treatment approaches
3
those that meet the individual patient's needs." Surgical castration
may be effective, singly or in combination with psychological treatment
approaches, but Pacht has his doubts: "[Ilt is difficult to understand
how rapists, who may already feel inadequate sexually, can be aided by
a process which may serve to enhance their sense of inadequacy."" In
sum, this medical research suggests that it is doubtful that surgical castration or Depo-Provera would be effective rape therapies. What judi-

method for treatment. Without such information, a conclusion that Depo-Provera is effective for this use would be completely conjectural.
Letter from Sidney Wolfe and Cary LaChen, of Public Citizens Health Research Group, to Robert J. Brooks, Chairman of the Conn. Depo-Provera Task Force, Conn. Dep't of Corrections (Oct.
17, 1983); see Appellant's Brief at exhibit 17, People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich App. 737, 352
N.W.2d 310 (1984).
36. Able, supra note 7, at 108.
37. Money, supra note 22, at 118.
38. Gagne, supra note 22, at 645.
39. Pacht, supra note 35, at 90.
40. Depo-Provera: A Shot to the System, 7 INsTrrtTIoNs ETC. 4 (1984) (quoting Robert
Trojanowicz, Director of the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University).
41. Pacht, supra note 35, at 91.
42. Id. at 92.
43. Id. at 93-94.
44. Id. at 95.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
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cial reception were they given in the first two cases where, as conditions
for the probation of convicted rapists, they were the subject of appellate review.
B.

Judicial Reception

Surgical castration of rapists for criminal reasons has not met with
a favorable reception in American courts. 5 The South Carolina Supreme Court recently confirmed this view in State v. Brown."' The case
involved a brutal gang rape in which three defendants plead guilty in
the hope that as first offenders they would receive lenient sentences.
The trial judge, however, sentenced them to thirty years' imprisonment,
provided, however, that if any one of them agreed to be castrated, his
sentence would be suspended and he would be placed on probation for
five years.47 The South Carolina Supreme Court, in a very brief opinion, agreed that a judge had wide discretion in imposing conditions of
probation"4 but held that the decision to impose castration as a condition of probation was an abuse of discretion because it violated the
public policy contained in the state constitution's prohibition against
9
cruel and unusual punishment.
Depo-Provera gained national attention when Roger Gauntlett, an
Upjohn heir, was convicted on a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct for the rape of his twelve-year-old
stepdaughter.50 The trial court sentenced Gauntlett to five years' probation with the first year to be served in the county jail.5 1 As a condition
of probation, the judge required Gauntlett to submit himself to chemical castration patterned after the research performed at Johns Hopkins
Hospital. 2
The Court of Appeals of Michigan in People v. Gauntlett53 found
45. See. e.g.. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) (holding unconstitutional as
cruel and unusual punishment a Nevada statute providing for the performance of vasectomies on
rapists); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (holding unconstitutional an Iowa statute
requiring the sterilization of men convicted of their second felony). See infra note 121.
46. 284 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985).
47. See Sherrill, Castration or Incarceration?, 122 TIME, Dec. 12, 1983, at 70; Decisions,
Decisions, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 26, 1983, at 4.
48. Brown, 284 S.C. at 410, 326 S.E.2d at 410.
49. Id. at 410-1l, 326 S.E.2d at 411-12.
50. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 31, 1984, at 7.
51. Order of Probation, People v. Gauntlett, No. D 824-00-076 FY (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Kalamazoo County Jan. 30, 1984); see Appellant's Brief at Exhibit 19, People v. Gauntlett, 134
Mich. 909, 353 N.W.2d 463 (1984); Supplement to Sentencing Remarks & Amendment to Order
of Probation, People v. Gauntlett, No. D 824-00-076 FY (Mich. Cir. Ct., Kalamazoo County Feb.
6, 1984).
52. People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. 737, 744, 352 N.W.2d 310, 313 modified, 419
Mich. 909, 353 N.W.2d 463 (1984) (quoting trial court's probation order).
53. eCommons,
Id.
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it unnecessary to examine the defendant's arguments that DepoProvera was a "form of sterilization" which violated a broad range of
his federal constitutional rights.5 4 The appellate court, relying on narrower grounds, held that the trial judge had imposed an illegal probation condition.5 5 First, there was no statutory authorization for treating
sex offenders with the drug. The court was unwilling to interpret the
state probation statute, which allowed trial courts at their discretion 5to6
impose "other lawful conditions," to permit the use of Depo-Provera.
Michigan case law, the drug's experimental status, and its "alphabet of
'5 7
adverse reactions from acne to cancer to weight gain" cast doubt on
58
its validity as a probation condition. Second, the professional literature demonstrated that Depo-Provera had not "gained acceptance in
59
the medical community as a safe and reliable medical procedure."
Third, Depo-Provera's experimental status, the limited professional
literature on its use, the limited availability of the drug, and the content of the judge's order made it virtually impossible for the defendant
60
to perform the probation condition. Fourth, the court suggested a
problem in the complete lack of informed consent by the defendant
when Michigan law affords mentally incompetent persons and prison
inmates "a greater degree of protection from extraordinary medical
procedures." 1 The appellate court also held that the trial judge had
2
abused his discretion under Michigan case law" because the defendant's sentence was "so significantly disproportionate to [harsher]
63
sentences generally imposed on similarly situated defendants." The
Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the appellate court's finding that
the use of Depo-Provera was an unlawful probation condition, but it
concluded that it had been premature to decide that the judge had
abused his sentencing discretion.64 As modified, the case was remanded

54. Id. at 476-47, 352 N.W.2d at 314. The content of defendant's constitutional claims are
contained in Appellant's Brief at 43-81, People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W.2d
310 (1984).
55. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. at 746-63, 352 N.W.2d at 314-21. The appellant's arguments on the four points presented below are discussed in Appellant's Brief at 82-133, People v.
Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W.2d 310 (1984).
56. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. at 747-49, 352 N.W.2d at 314-15 (citing MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 771.3(4) (West 1982)).
57. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. at 748, 352 N.W.2d at 315.
58. Id. at 746, 352 N.W.2d at 316.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 751, 352 N.W.2d at 316.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 753, 352 N.W.2d at 317 (citing People v. Cole, 417 Mich. 523, 339 N.W.2d 440
(1983)).
63. Id. at 753, 352 N.W.2d at 318.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
64. People v. Gauntlett, 419 Mich. 909, 353 N.W.2d 464 (1984).
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for resentencing.
C. Summary
Surgical and chemical castration are probation alternatives for
convicted rapists which have, so far, met a hostile appellate judicial
reception. Surgical castration is too severe. Depo-Provera is probably
too lenient. The courts deciding Brown and Gauntlett did not, however,
address all relevant arguments raised by the defendants. The Michigan
Supreme Court based its decision primarily on two nonconstitutional
probation arguments: impossibility and informed consent. The South
Carolina Supreme Court found one violation of the defendant's state
constitutional rights. What are the other relevant arguments which
may be raised by other defendants in the future? Sections III and IV
will examine analogous state and federal case law in order to evaluate
the statutory and constitutional arguments raised by the use of these
two medical therapies as probation conditions for convicted rapists.
III.

STATUTORY ARGUMENTS

Judges have made offers of probation conditioned on the performance of surgical castration or the use of Depo-Provera. Convicted rapists have accepted these conditions. These offers and their acceptance
raise two questions about the use of medical therapies as probation conditions which will be addressed in this section. First, is it unreasonable
and impractical for a judge to impose these conditions? Second, can a
convicted rapist give his knowing and informed consent?
A.

Offer of Probation

Courts have no common-law power of probation: it is "a creature
of statute." 6 Whether a defendant is eligible for probation depends
upon state and federal statutes. Felony probation exists, but convicted
felons, including rapists, are generally ineligible for probation because
statutes prohibit parole for persons with prior felony convictions, those
convicted of violent felonies, and those who will serve lengthy prison
terms if not probated. 6 All defendants eligible for probation are subject to statutorily enumerated general conditions which include requirements that they obey all laws and regularly report to their probation

65.

G.

H. KERPER & P. CROMWELL, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL
34 (1976) [hereinafter G. KILLINGER].
66. Id. at 36; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(e)(4) (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
60.05(6), 70.04(2), (3), (4), 70.06(2)-(4), 70.10(2) (McKinney Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2929.01(5), 2951.02(F)(2), (6) (Anderson Supp. 1985); TEX CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §
42.12bysec.
3a(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1986).
Published
eCommons,
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officer. 67 Statutes also limit the term or length of probation. Most federal and state statutes limit felony probation to five years.68 "These
limitations are often closely related to the maximum term fixed by statute for the offense had the offender been committed to a penal institution."'6 9 Aside from these minimal requirements for the defendant's eligibility and the conditions and terms of his probation, statutes provide
virtually no guidance for judges. As a consequence, trial court judges
and juries have broad discretion to determine what conditions best suit
the needs of the convicted offender. °
Medical and psychiatric treatment are two conditions a judge, at
his or her own initiative or on the basis of specific statutory authorization, may offer a convicted rapist. 71 A court's offer of probation is not,
however, unfettered. The conditions of probation must be reasonably
related to the offense and capable of being performed within the term
of probation. 72 Therefore, the question is: If a statute permits the probation of rape offenders, can an offer of probation which requires their
participation in a program of surgical or chemical castration be challenged on the ground that these conditions are unreasonable and incapable of performance?
Treatment as a probation condition must be reasonably related to
the defendant's rehabilitation. 73 A probation condition is unreasonable,
according to the California Court of Appeals in In re Mannino, if it
"has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted.
• . [and] requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to
future criminality.1 74 Castration and Depo-Provera will fail both parts
67. G. KILLINGER, supra note 65, at 69-72; see e.g.. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 1203.1,
1203.2(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-3 (Smith-Herd Supp.
1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2951.02(c) (Anderson Supp. 1985); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-2(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd
1982) (probation for felonies limited to four years); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (McKinney Supp.
1986) (probation generally limited to five years except for informents who may be granted lifetime
probation); MODEL PENAL CODE 301.2 § (1962) (recomending five years maximum probation for
felons); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.3(6)(ii) (1976) (same). Contra TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (probation allowed for up to ten years).

G. KILLINGER, supra note 65, at 84.
See generally S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS IN A
NUTSHELL 324 (2d ed. 1983).
71. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 5, at 317-24 (1983); see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §
65.10(2)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1986); MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1(2)(c) (1962); STANDARDS FOR
69.
70.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.3(f)(v) (1979).

72. G. KILLINGER, supra note 65, at 72.
73. Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1 explanatory note at 302 (1963).
74. In re Mannino, 14 Cal App. 3d 953, 961 n.4, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 883 n.4 (1971) (quoting People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 626-27, 64 Cal. Rptr 290 (1967)). The Mannino
court noted that the Dominguez test had been restated in the disjunctive-suggesting that failure
to meet any one part of the test would invalidate a probation condition-in In re Bushman, I Cal.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
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of the Mannino test. First, these treatments have no relationship, as
medical therapies, to the defendant's criminal behavior to the extent
that a rapist's behavior is motivated chiefly by hatred and fear, feelings
that have little to do with sexual gratification. 7 5 Second, they are medical therapies which for the same reason probably bear no relationship
to the convicted rapist's future criminality. Castration or Depo-Provera
will reduce a rapist's sexual drive, one permanently and one temporarily, and thereby interfere with the privacy of his family life and his
right to procreate, 70 but it is not at all clear that these treatments will
reduce a rapist's impulse to attack women.77
Treatment, as a probation condition, must be capable of performance within the term of probation. 78 A condition of probation to be
capable of performance must, first of all, be available to the convicted
defendant. Whether a treatment is available depends upon whether
there are medical personnel to carry the treatment out. 79 Surgical castration is probably unavailable in the United States. Courts may grant
a defendant's request for castration or impose castration upon him as a
probation condition, but physicians, unsure about their liability, are unlikely to perform the procedure.8 0 Depo-Provera is theoretically available, although until recently it could be obtained only at the Johns Hop-

3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970).
75. Pacht, supra note 35, at 90-97. In People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. 737, 352
N.W.2d 310 (1980), the defendant argued on appeal that Depo-Provera was an unwarranted probation condition because he "was not diagnosed as having a paraphilia syndrome or high testosterone [level] which might be treated by the drug . . . [and] there was insufficient evidence that
Depo-provera is efficacious as a remedy for incest." Appellant's Brief at 133, People v. Gauntlett,
134 Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W.2d 310 (1984).
76. A probation condition may not interfere with the protected areas of family life and the
right to procreate. See, e.g., Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Livingston, 53 Ohio App. 2d 195, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (1976).
77. J. MACDONALD, supra note 11, at 313; Pacht, supra note 35, at 90-97.
78. G. KILLIN ER, supra note 65, at 72.
79. In the Gauntlett and Brown cases, the trial court judges did not determine whether
medical personnel were available. In Brown, the defendant argued on appeal that "the trial court
Judge . . .offered the probationary sentence if the defendant would submit to surgical castration.
The sentence did not provide how, when, or where the procedure would be done. Nor did the
sentence designate any particular facility to administer the surgical procedure." Defendant's Brief
at 5, State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 411 (1985).
80. Rees, supra note 19, at 30-31. In one California case, the court denied the castration
requests of two convicted child molesters because no doctor would perform the operation. Id.
(citing People v. Kenner, No.... slip op. at 14 (San Diego Super. Ct., Sept 30, 1975)). One
reason why doctors refused to perform the operation was their fear of civil liability. Id. at 31
(citing Kenner, No. -, slip op. at 15). Despite having "filed waivers releasing their lawyers, the
judge, and the surgeon from civil liability, they never obtained the sought-after procedure. The
surgeon, on discovering that despite the waivers, he might still be liable for criminal prosecution,
withdrew his consent . . . " Bohmer, Legal and Ethical Issues in Mandatory Treatment: The
Patient's Rights Versus Society's Rights, in THE SEXUAL AGGRESSOR 12 (J.Greer & 1.Stuart
eds. 1983).
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kins Hospital. Nevertheless, it is practically unavailable to almost all
convicted rapists because they are unable to afford the cost of the treatment. Whether a treatment is available also depends upon whether it is
medically advisable to administer the treatment. Depo-Provera's experimental status, "alphabet of adverse reactions," and lack of acceptance
as a safe and reliable drug may make it medically unavailable, especially when medical and psychiatric examinations demonstrate that it
would be detrimental to a convicted rapist's health.8 1
Secondly, to be capable of performance, a condition of probation
must be able to be fulfilled within the probationary term. In the federal
2
system and most states, felony probation is limited to five years. Castration and Depo-Provera fail this fulfillment test. These treatments do
not permanently eliminate or reduce sexual potency. Castration is not
"the total treatment."8 " Two of the eighteen rapists castrated at Herstedvester were able to have sexual intercourse three or four times a
month.8 4 Moreover, "[t]here is always the possibility that the offender
85
may obtain . . . [testosterone] illegally to restore his sexual drive."
Depo-Provera must be used continuously because it produces only a
temporary reduction in testosterone production. Once Depo-Provera is
86
discontinued, sexual potency returns to its pretreatment level. As a
consequence, an offer of probation would have to be based on a condition which forbids the convicted rapist from using testosterone to restore his sexual potency or which requires him to take Depo-Provera
injections to maintain his testosterone at a safe level. These conditions
would, however, violate all existing federal and state probation statutes
because the conditions would require lifetime probation.87 Lifetime probation which requires the continued use of Depo-Provera would also be
subject to challenge on grounds of unreasonableness because the drug's
81. In Gauntlett, the defendant argued on appeal that it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court judge to impose a Depo-Provera probation condition without a medical examination
when he was aware that the drug was controversial, experimental, unlicensed to treat rape offenders, and contraindicated by the defendant's treating physician. Defendant argued that the judge
had in effect become a "medical expert . . . and sexologist . . . who had sentenced him . . . to
participate in a scientific experiment." Appellant's Brief at 91, 102-03, People v. Gauntlett, 134
Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W.2d 310 (1984). The Michigan appellate court agreed with the defendant, Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. at 746-52, 352 N.W.2d 314-16, but the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld defendant's appeal on other grounds. Gauntlett, 419 Mich. at 909, 353 N.W.2d at
463.
82. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
83. Sturup, supra note 10, at 361.
84. J. MACDONALD, supra note I1, at 313; Rees, supra note 19, at 33-36.
85. J. MACDONALD, supra note 11, at 314.
86. Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 22, at 607; Cordoba & Chapel, supra note 31, at 1037.
87. Only New York currently provides for lifetime probation and only for recidivist drug
addicts who are "providing material assistance in the investigation, apprehension or prosecution of
" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
.. . [drug related offenses] ....
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
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long-term use may lead to cancer.
B.

Acceptance of Probation

Probation cannot be imposed unless the defendant accepts it. 88 The
defendant's acceptance must be knowing and voluntary. 89 Informed
consent by a patient depends not only upon information on the diagnosis, the purpose of the treatment, and the nature and duration of the
therapy but also on four factors identified in Canterbury v. Spense:90
the known risks of the contemplated treatment, the expected benefit,
the possible disadvantages without any treatment, and the alternative
methods of treatment available. 9 If a judge offers a convicted rapist
either castration or Depo-Provera as a probation condition, it will not
be possible to provide the rapist with relevant information about each
of the Canterbury criteria, because the research on surgical castration
and Depo-Provera are based almost exclusively on case reports with
paraphiliacs, not rapists. 92 Moreover, the results of these studies are
often contradictory and the few follow-up studies that have been conducted are inconclusive. 93 As a consequence, the defendant will not be
88. G. KILLINGER, supra note 65, at 54.
89. Acceptance or refusal of Depo-Provera, an experimental drug, raise . an issue of voluntary and informed consent to human experimentation which has its legal roots in common law and
in state and federal statutory and administrative regulations on the use of coercive treatment of
and experimentation on incarcerated criminals and mental patients. See generally G. ANNAS, L.
GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA (1977); R. SCHWITZGEBEL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ENFORCED TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS
42-84 (1979); D. WEXLER, CRIMINAL COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS: LEGAL

ISSUES OF CONFINEMENT, TREATMENT, AND RELEASE (1976); Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes
and the Decision Making Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163 (1984); Bohmer, supra note 80, at 12;
Marco & Marco, Antabuse: Medication in Exchange for a Limited Freedom-Is It Legal?, 5 AM.
J. L. & MED. 295, 301-17 (1979).
90. 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
91. Spense and another landmark informed-consent case, Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,
502 P.2d I, 104 Cal Rptr. 505 (1972), represent the minority "reasonable patient" standard. A
majority of jurisdictions employ a "professional" standard in determining whether the disclosure
of information is material. The reasonable patient position is a more demanding standard than the
professional standard represented by Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 845 (1974), and Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965), but less demanding than
the "individual patient" standard of Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979). See also Andrews, supra note 89, at 176-77.
92. Abel, supra note 7, at 100; see also notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
The Johns Hopkins Biosexual Hormonal Clinic's fact sheet and consent form are also probably inadequate to provide the patient with sufficient information so that he can give his informed
consent. The consent form outlines the treatment and enumerates several side effects, but it does
not mention nearly half of the possible side effects. See Johns Hopkins Biosexual Psychohormonal
Clinic Fact Sheet and Biosexual Psychohormonal Clinic Consent Form in Appellant's Brief at
Exhibits 6 & 20, People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W.2d 310 (1984).
93. Gagne concluded that after treatment was terminated "[n]one of the 40 improved patients returned to his pretreatment social behavior." Gagne, supra note 22, at 645. However, Berlin and Meinecke found that "[tlhe recidivism rate jumped dramatically when the patient disconPublished
by eCommons, 1986
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able to give his informed consent to surgical castration or to DepoProvera therapy as a treatment for rape.
Voluntary consent depends upon a person's ability to make a
choice freely. Courts have determined that consent given by convicted
defendants, prisoners, and institutionalized mental patients to psychosurgery or psychoactive drugs given as a condition of probation or parole has been coerced.94 In Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health,9" the court held that when a mental patient's release might
depend upon his consent to experimental surgery, coercion exists and
voluntary consent cannot be givenY6 The convicted rapist is faced with
two options-a lengthy prison sentence or even death on the one hand
and Depo-Provera or surgical castration on the other-and cannot be
97
said to have the capacity to act freely in making a choice. Freedom of
choice is impossible because the convict's loss of liberty constitutes a
deprivation of such a magnitude that he cannot choose freely and vol-

tinued their medication regimen." Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 22, at 605.
94. Cases involving convicted defendants, prisoners, and institutionalized mental patients
which support a rape offender's right to voluntary consent to surgical castration or the use of
Depo-Provera include Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Mackey v. Procunier,
477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo.
1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Alderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Janise, 116 Ariz. 557, 570 P.2d 499 (1977); Wolonsky v.
Bolsom, 58 Ohio App. 2d 25, 378 N.E.2d 625 (1976).
95. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973) reprinted in
full in S. SHUMAN, PSYCHOSURGERY AND THE MEDICAL CONTROL OF VIOLENCE: AUTONOMY AND
DEVIANCE 21-240 (1977) summarized in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973); see also G. ANNAS,
L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, supra note 89, at 215-55; Note, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health: A Right to Be Free from Experimental Surgery, 54 B.U.L. REV. 301 (1974).
.
96. Kaimowitz, Civil No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at _
97. In Brown, the American Civil Liberties Union in its amicus curiae brief argued that the
defendants' choice was not voluntary. Amici Curiae Brief at 9, State v. Brown, 283 S.C. 407, 326
S.E.2d 410 (1985). The A.C.L.U. made two major voluntariness arguments. First, a judge may
not induce their consent and thereby "coerce the defendants to waive their federal constitutional
rights not to have the cruel and unusual punishment of castration inflicted upon them." Id. In
support of this argument, the A.C.L.U. cited the following cases: Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21
(1974) (overturned state practice of bringing more serious charges against a defendant at trial as
chilling his right to trial de novo); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (invalidated
more severe sentence imposed following successful appeal and reconviction); and United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (overturned death penalty clause in federal kidnapping statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1964), which provided for death sentence only upon jury trial). Second, a judge
may not achieve indirectly what he could not directly command. "ifthe sentencing judge could
not have directly ordered castration of the convicted defendants, then the judge may not achieve
the same result through the device of alternative sentencing." Amici Curiae Brief at -, State
v. Brown, 283 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985). In support of this argument, the A.C.L.U. cited
Henry v. State, 276 S.C. 515, 280 S.E.2d 536 (1981), which invalidated a sentence of banishment
as a condition of probation. On this point, one commentator states that the principle operating in
banishment cases is that "restrictions forbidden as penal sanctions are impermissible conditions of
...
Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 197 (1967).
probation.
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untarily, but he is forced to give consent to an alternative he would not
otherwise have chosen. In such circumstances men are willing to "barter their bodies." In his study of castration, Johan Bremer found "that
the main motive of the majority was to regain freedom as soon as possible." 9 8 As a consequence, the convicted rapist cannot give voluntary
consent to an offer of probation which contains a surgical castration or
Depo-Provera condition.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Sentencing defendants to probation as an alternative to incarceration must occur in a manner consistent with their constitutional
rights."" An offer of probation which is unreasonable or impossible because it includes a condition which requires the convicted rapist's participation in a program of surgical castration or the use of DepoProvera may also violate his substantive and procedural constitutional
rights. Acceptance of a castration condition which is invalid because of
the convicted rapist's inability to give informed consent may involve a
violation of his constitutional right to procedural due process. Moreover, if his choice occurs without voluntary consent, it may involve a
violation of his substantive constitutional rights to freedom of thought,
privacy, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and equal protection of the law.10 0

Mental
Autonomy
------------------------------------

Mental
Integrity

Figure I.

98.

Bodily
Autonomy
----------------

f

Bodily
Integrity

Four Claims to Constitutional Liberty

J. BREMER, ASEXUALIZATION 319 (1959).

99. A probation condition which requires medical or psychiatric treatment may violate a
number of a probationer's constitutional rights including the right to expression, association, and
religion and may also involve an illegal search and seizure, a cruel and unusual punishment, and
an invasion of privacy. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 5, at 212-17, 252-56; R. SCHWITZGEBEL,
supra note 89, at 5-42.
100. Comment, The Use of Depo-Proverafor Treating Male Sex Offenders: A Review of
the Constitutionaland Medical Issues, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 181 (1984).
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These constitutional rights implicated by the offer and acceptance
of castration conditions have a common concern; they are based on two
kinds of freedom-freedom to (autonomy) and freedom from (integrity)-related to the body and the mind.10 ' The intersection of these
two distinctions produces four areas of freedom represented in Figure 1
which may serve as a vehicle to evaluate the specific constitutional provisions at issue.' 0 2 The first amendment's free speech clause involves a
right to mental autonomy: the freedom to generate one's own
thoughts.1 0 3 The eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause contains a right to bodily integrity: freedom from bodily invasions.104 The privacy component of the fourteenth amendment due process clause's liberty guarantee protects bodily autonomy: "the freedom
to generate behaviors."' 0 5 No constitutional provision explicitly protects
6
mental integrity: freedom from intrusions upon one's mind." How
may probation conditions which require the use of these two medical
therapies, Depo-Provera or surgical castration, intrude upon these four
personal freedoms of the defendant in such a manner as to violate his
first, eighth, and fourteenth amendment rights?
A.

First Amendment

Conditions in an offer of probation are subject to first amendment
scrutiny.10 7 The first amendment right to freedom of expression includes a guarantee of mental autonomy and, within its penumbras, a
right to privacy.' 0 8 In Stanley v. Georgia,"9 the United States Supreme
Court made the most explicit statement of a right to mental autonomy.
Justice Marshall speaking for the Court in Stanley suggested that it is
wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the first amendment to grant

101. Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic
Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 497, 502-03.
102. Id. at 503 n.30.
103. Id. at 508.
104. Id. at 520.
105. Id. at 508.
106. Id. The author states that "It]he claim to mental integrity is the claim that the decision to allow the psychotropic drug to work its effects upon the mind, in exchange for its purported benefits, is a decision that ought to be made by the patient and not by the physician." Id.
at 505. The author argues that "patients need not call on courts to establish such a right, because
they can argue that unconsented psychotropic drug treatment violates already established constitutional rights to mental autonomy and bodily integrity. . . . [That is] they can argue that government interference with their minds is a means to the impermissible end of preventing them, in
some sense, from thinking. . . . [Or they can argue that it] is an end achieved only by massive
intrusions into their bodies." Id. at 508.
107. See N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 5, at 213, 252-54; Greenburg, Probation
Conditions and the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. .L. & Soc. PROBS. 45 (1981).
108. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
109. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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government the power to control a person's thoughts, including loathsome, noxious, and immoral thoughts.1 10 Subsequently, the Michigan
Circuit Court in Kaimowitz recognized that psychosurgery intrudes
upon a person's mental processes and generation of ideas, which come
within the ambit of the first amendment' and its right of privacy." 2
Depo-Provera or surgical castration intrudes upon the rapist's ability to think about sex. In his study of rape offenders, John MacDonald
found that "[t]he main effect of castration on men . . . is that their
capacity to respond to sexual stimuli is diminished, as is their sexual
fantasy life and their sexual interests in general.""' George Sturup
goes even further and states that "castration results in complete elimination of interest in sexual relations.""' 4 Similar findings are reported
with the use of Depo-Provera: "[T]he effects of MPA cannot simply be
interpreted by its androgen-depleting effect. There is a direct effect on
cerebral functions."" 5 Studies at John Hopkins and Sherbrooke agree
that the use of Depo-Provera diminishes sexual fantasies. John Money
found a reduction in the content of imagistic eroticism, including "sexual or erotic sleeping dreams, day dreams, or masturbation and copulation fantasies." ' 0
The first amendment does not prohibit all intrusions on mental autonomy. In Rennie v. Klein, a case involving the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs to a mental patient, a Federal District
Court in New Jersey ruled that whether the drug impermissibly intrudes upon a person's freedom to think or his right to privacy in
thoughts about sex depends on the length and permanency of its effect
on his senses and his ability to think and speak." 7 Measured by the
Rennie effects test, surgical castration arguably violates the convicted
rapist's first amendment rights because the effect on his freedom of
thought and privacy in those thoughts is long-term and irreversible." 8

110. See id. at 565-66.
111. Kaimowitz, No. 83.-194349-AW slip op. at __; see also S. SHUMAN, supra note 95,
at 212-20.
112. Kaimowitz, No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at __;
see S. SHUMAN, supra note 95, at
214-15; see also Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Mackey, 477 F.2d at 877; Rogers,
478 F. Supp. at 1342; Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1131. For a discussion of the first amendment right
of mentation, see M. SHAPIRO, BIOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW
(1982); S. SHUMAN, supra note 95 at 114-36; Shapiro, Therapeutic Justificationsfor Intervention
into Mentation and Behavior, 13 DUQ. L. REV. 673 (1975).
113. J. MACDONALD, supra note I1, at 306.
114. Sturup, supra note 10, at 374.
115. Blumer & Migeon, supra note 22, at 128.
116. Money, supra note 22, at 109.
117. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1144.
118. See J. MACDONALD, supra note 11, at 306-07. The court in Rennie found that the
defendant's
forced medication
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The use of Depo-Provera would also violate the convicted rapist's first
amendment rights. Its effects are said to be temporary and reversible,
but the efficacy of the treatment requires its continued use.' 19
B. Eighth Amendment
Conditions in a grant of probation are subject to the eighth
amendment's limitation on cruel and unusual punishment. 12 0 Whether
a surgical castration or Depo-Provera condition, both bodily intrusions,
violates a rape offenders eighth amendment right to bodily integrity
depends on the answers to two questions: First, do these conditions result in treatment or punishment? Second, are these conditions cruel
and unusual punishment?
Surgical castration or Depo-Provera are not exempt from eighth
amendment scrutiny merely because they are characterized as treatment. " ' In Rennie, the court established a four-part test to determine
whether any therapy is treatment or punishment: (1)does it have any
theraputic value, (2) is its use recognized as accepted medical practice,
(3) is it part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program, and (4) even
though it may have long-term benefits, are its adverse effects unreasonably harsh? 1 22 Applying the Rennie test, Depo-Provera may, arguably,
have theraputic value. Used in conjunction with psychotherapy since
1966, Depo-Provera is reported to be "the most effective form of
clinical management for the sexual offender on probation."' 23 Pierre
Gagne found that the drug has short-term side effects, but there was
"no evidence of permanent physiological change.' 24 Surgical castration is also said to have theraputic value for "a person whose sexual
drive exposes him to commit crimes, brings about psychic suffering, or

did not interfere with his thought processes or freedom to generate ideas. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at
1143-44; see Note, Constitutional Law--Rennie v. Klein: Constitutional Right of Privacy Protects A Mental Patient's Refusal of Psychotropic Medication, 57 N.C.L. REV. 1481, 1486 (1979).
119. Abel, supra note 7, at 108; Bohmer, supra note 80, at I1;Gagne, supra note 22, at
646.
120. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 5, at 215; Symonds, Mental Patients' Right to
Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 701 (1980).
121. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973); Mackey, 477 F.2d at 877;
Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Best & Birzon, supra note 5, at 828; Note,
Aversion Therapy: Punishment as Treatment and Treatment as Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 880, 946-59 (1976).
122. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1143 (the court in Rennie found that the defendant's forced
medication did not infringe upon his eighth amendment right because the prolixin was a drug of
proven effectiveness which was "an integral component of an overall treatment program.") See
generally Note, supra note 118, at 1481.
123. Cordoba & Chapel, supra note 31, at 1039.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
124. Gagne, supra note 22, at 645.
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causes social harm." 12 5 According to Georg Sturup, castration used in
conjunction with psychotherapy produced long-term benefits with no
unreasonably harsh physical or psychological side effects.12 6 These research findings are, however, questionable because they are not based
on controlled group studies.12 7 Nevertheless, these two medical therapies do not qualify as treatment for rapists under the Rennie test. Surgical castration is not a medically acceptable procedure for criminals in
the United States. 128 Depo-Provera is an experimental procedure for
criminals that is a suspected carcinogen. 129 Studies have also confirmed
that surgical castration has not been established as a valid treatment
for rapists. At Herstedvester, only thirty-eight rapists were surgically
castrated, and follow-up studies which were limited to eleven rapists
were inconclusive. 180 Surgical castration is also unlikely to be an effective treatment because rape is primarily an act of aggression, not sex-.
As Johan Bremer observes, "castration is only of theraputic significance in behavioral disturbances involving an urge for sexual relief. No
general affect on pacification has been encountered at all. . . no
'resocializing' influence on social or antisocial behavior beyond the sexual sphere.' 3 Depo-Provera is not a valid treatment for rapists. The
conclusion that the drug reduces sex drive and aggressiveness is based
on John Money's study of XY and XYY sex offenders, which included
32
pedophiliacs but no rapists."
Since neither surgical castration nor Depo-Provera may qualify as
a treatment for rapists, then the second question can be addressed: Is
either procedure cruel and unusual punishment? The Supreme Court
Justices, unable to agree, have enunciated three separate tests which

125. Sturup, supra note 10, at 366.
126. Id. at 375.
127. See supra note 35.
128. Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468
(1917); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918). The district court's holding in Berry and
Mickle suggest that castration is not a permissible punishment for rape offenders. The cases
struck down state statutes permitting the performance of vasectomies on habitual criminals holding that the statutes were repugnant to the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
A California court provides precedent which suggests that castration is a permissible probation condition. People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 552 (1936). In Blankenship,
the defendant was convicted of statutory rape. The court offered probation conditioned on having
a vasectomy. Blankenship was, however, subsequently condemned in People v. Becker, 349 Mich.
476, 488, 84 N.W.2d 838, 839 (1957), and described as "dubious authority" in People v. Dominquez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1962).
129. See supra note 32.
130. J. MACDONALD supra note 11,at 306; Abel, supra note 7, at 108.
131. J. BREMER, supra note 98, at 318; Blumer & Migeon, supra note 22, at 129.
132.eCommons,
Money, supra
note 22, at 118.
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may be used to answer the question.13 The first, applied in Trop v.
Dulles, 3 4 asks whether the punishment is inherently cruel .1

5

"The cas-

tration operation always involves an injury owing to the mutilation itself, to changes of endocrine origin-sexual, somatic, and psychic-and
to the unfortunate emotional reaction." 1' 3 6 Depo-Provera, like castra-

tion, impairs the ability to procreate for an offense that has little to do
with sex. "It shrinks the testicles. It prevents ejaculation. It stops the
production

of sperm.

It can produce

defective sperm."113 7 Depo-

Provera's effects, unlike castration, may be reversible, but since it is an
experimental drug which must be administered for life to be effective, 138 it is also inherently cruel.13 9 Under the Trop test, a court would
be likely to find that the use of surgical castration or Depo-Provera
would shock the conscience, because it permanently mutilates the

body. 140
The second test, applied in Weems v. United States,"' asks
whether the punishment is greatly disproportionate to the offense for
which it is imposed. Under the Weems test, a court would find that
both conditions are disproportionate to other penalties imposed for
rape. Castration is an irreversible procedure and Depo-Provera is an
experimental drug whose required use would have adverse side effects,14 2 whereas incarceration for rape in some jurisdictions may result
in a minimum one-year sentence.
Under the third test, applied in Furman v. Georgia,"3 the question
is whether the punishment exceeds what is necessary to accomplish the
state's legitimate aims. Surgical castration would fail the Furman test
for cruel and unusual punishment because the less intrusive alternatives
of imprisonment or psychotherapy are available.'" Depo-Provera would

133.
134.
135.

136.

Note, supra note 121, at 925-46.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Id. at 101-02.
J. BREMER, supra note 98, at 318.

137. Appellant's Brief at I 11, People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W.2d 310
(1984).
138. See supra notes 30 & 34.
139. The forcible injection of psychotropic drugs may also be inherently cruel inviolation of
the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Mackey, 477 F.2d at 877; Knecht, 488 F.2d at 1136.
140. The fourth and fourteenth amendments also protect a person's bodily integrity to the
extent that they prohibit unwarranted searches of one's body. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 772 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 442-44 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). The same amendments also support a right to be
free from probation conditions which impose a bodily intrusion. See Springer v. United States,
148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945).

141. 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
142. See generally supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
143. 408 U.S. 238, 279, 342 (1972) (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J., concurring).
144. Pacht identifies other traditional and innovative approaches to rape treatment which
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
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fail the Furman test because its practical value in accomplishing the
state's aim of reducing the incidence of rape is not more clearly demonstrated than less intrusive methods such as imprisonment or psychotherapy. 145 Therefore, both probation conditions are in constitutional
jeopardy no matter which eighth amendment test is used.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Conditions of probation must be made in a manner consistent with
the fourteenth amendment's guarantees of procedural and substantive
due process. 146 A due process clause analysis asks two procedural questions relevant to the convicted rapist's decision about probation. First,
is there a sufficient liberty interest involved? A choice between a long
term of imprisonment and probation certainly involves a sufficient liberty interest that due process requires a hearing. A hearing is also required to insure that if the convicted rapist chooses surgical castration
or the use of Depo-Provera, that he consents knowingly and voluntarily,
aware of the first, eighth, and fourteenth amendment rights he will
waive. Since the probation decision involves a sufficient liberty interest,
the second question is: What kind of hearing is required? Post-plea
hearings and sentencing conferences are used in states where judges
make the decision and a sentencing hearing is held in states which rely
on jury sentencing. 4 7 The court in Rennie suggests that a lawyer is
needed to cope with substantive legal problems and to assure that
proper procedures are followed.1 48 Moreover, an independent psychiatrist is needed for a fair hearing. "[T]he patient is entitled to an
outside psychiatrist of his choice to evaluate the need for medication"
or surgery. 14 ' Furthermore, the court in Rennie would require that
"[w]here the patient cannot reasonably afford an attorney or a psychiatrist, the state must supply them."' 150 Failure to grant a convicted rapist
these hearing rights may expose a probation offer containing a DepoProvera or surgical castration condition to a due process challenge.' 5 '

are less intrusive than surgical castration and Depo-Provera such as social skills training and
individual, couple, family, and group therapy. Pacht, supra note 35, at 95.
145. Id.
146. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 5, at 215-16, 254-56.
147. G. KILLINGER, supra note 65, at 49.
148. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1147.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1148.
151. A probation condition may also be subject to other challenges. First, it can be challenged because it is unreasonable and thus violative of due prossess. Second, a condition may be
challenged if it is based on unverified assumptions of fact. In Gauntlett, the defendant argued on
appeal that his due process rights had been violated because "the Court set a condition of probation on the basis of unverified assumptions concerning the legality, safety, efficacy, and appropriatenessby
of eCommons,
the drug for the1986
Defendant and failed to take into consideration the Defendant's ability
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The fourteenth amendment due process guarantee of liberty also
has a substantive component; it protects a person's privacy, specifically,
one's bodily autonomy which includes the freedom to make personal
decisions. Choosing whether to accept a probation condition which
would require the convicted rapist to undergo surgical castration or to
use Depo-Provera is an intensely personal decision. The probation condition requires the convicted rapist to make a personal medical choice.
In re Quinlan, 5 ' the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that the
right to privacy was broad enough to include personal decisions about
medical treatment.15 ' The probation condition also requires the defendant to make a personal sexual choice. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized that the right to privacy includes the
freedom to make personal decisions about procreation, contraception,
marriage, the termination of pregnancy, and the maintenance of family
relations.1 54 This sexual privacy right can be traced to Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 55 where the Supreme Court held that government-enforced
sterilization, a vasectomy, intruded upon a person's right to privacy in
marriage and procreation.1 56 Castration, like a vasectomy, destroys the
ability to procreate, but castration is more severe because it results in
the cessation of the sexual drive.' 57 The use of Depo-Provera also intrudes upon the personal right to procreate because its effect on testosterone levels leaves men sexually impotent. 5 8 As a result, surgical castration and Depo-Provera probation conditions involve the state in the
regulation of the enjoyment of the marriage relationship and of family
life.' 59

to perform the condition. The Court assumed Defendant was sick and diagnosed the condition as
curable by chemical means." Appellant's Brief at 81, People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. 737,
352 N.W.2d 310 (1984). See also supra note 81. Third, a probation condition may be challenged
on due process grounds as overly vague and as providing inadequate guidance for performance.
See N. COHEN & J.GOBERT, supra note 5, at 215-16.
152. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
153. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. Cases involving the privacy right of involuntarily committed mental patients to decide whether or not to be treated with psychoactive medication lend
support to a rape offender's right to decide whether or not to undergo surgical castration or treatment with Depo-Provera. See Mackey, 477 F.2d at 877; Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1131; Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
154. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).

155.

316 U.S. at 535.

156. Id. at 541-42. Skinner was, in form, an equal protection case, but the Supreme Court
emphasized in its opinion by Justice Douglas that it was dealing with procreation, a funadmental
right. Id. at 541.
157. Sturup, supra note 10, at 361.
158. Cordoba & Chapel, supra note 31, at 1038; Gagne, supra note 22, at 645.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/2
159. Moore, 431 U.S. at 494.

1986]

DEPO-PROVERA CASTRATION

The fourteenth amendment does not prohibit all intrusions on bodily autonomy. Here, however, a fundamental right is involved.
"[M]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence of
the race." 160 Government actions which restrict personal choices in
matters involving fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny and
the state may not intrude without a compelling interest."6 ' The state
has a compelling interest in protecting society from people convicted of
rape. A fundamental right also requires the government to employ the
least restrictive means to serve that compelling interest.16 2 An offer of
probation that includes a surgical castration condition would intrude
upon the defendant's right to privacy because there are less restrictive
alternatives available, such as imprisonment and psychotherapy. It is
also unlikely that a probation condition which required the use of
Depo-Provera could pass constitutional muster. Government actions
which do not restrict fundamental rights must still advance a legitimate
interest in the prevention of rape and must choose a means reasonably
related to the advancement of that goal.16 3 A probation condition which
requires the use of Depo-Provera cannot rationally advance that goal
because, as the research demonstrates, the drug is not effective in reducing the incidence of rape.' 6'
V.

CONCLUSIONS

A probation condition which requires a convicted rapist to undergo
surgical castration or the use of Depo-Provera is faulted on two
grounds. First, a castration condition is an illegal exercise of a court's
statutorily based power of probation. An offer of probation which includes a castration condition is not reasonably related to the crime of
rape. An offer of probation which to be effective will have to forbid

castrates from ever taking testosterone or to require them to take
Depo-Provera forever is also not capable of fulfillment within the term
of probation. Moreover, a convicted rapist cannot knowingly and freely

accept a castration condition in an offer of probation. Informed consent
to Depo-Provera or surgical castration cannot be given because the re-

search data are inadequate. Voluntary consent cannot be given to either procedure because incarceration is a deprivation of such magnitude that the rape offender is forced to "barter his body" for his

freedom. Second, a castration condition violates the defendant's constitutional rights. His right to mental autonomy is violated because surgi-

160. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
161. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
162. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
163. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
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cal castration or the use of Depo-Provera intrudes upon his first amendment right to think about sex and to the privacy of his sexual fantasies.
His right to bodily integrity is violated because neither procedure is a
rape treatment, but a cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment. And finally, surgical castration does not respect his due
process privacy right because it is not the least restrictive means to
serve the state's compelling interest in protecting society, nor does
Depo-Provera, because it is not rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in curbing rape.
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